Compulsory Hijab and Revolutionary Kurdish Feminism: Challenging Iran’s Islamist Regime

Supratim Halder
Jul 9
7 min read

Updated: 6 days ago

HISTORY OF THE KURDISH STRUGGLE: NATIONALISM, FEMINISM AND REPRESSION

The traces of Kurdish nationalism can be traced back to the Ottoman era, as their aspirations of an independent Kurdish nation remained distant following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire following the Treaty of Sevres (1920) as the Kurdish dominated regions got divided between Iran (Rojhalat), Iraq (Bashur), Syria (Rojava) and Turkey (Bakur). The epicentre of all Kurdish militancy has been Rojava, where they have successfully fought the Islamic State (ISIS) and are now fighting for the dream of an independent nation. While militancy remains active in all four nations, Iran’s additional theocratic repression of women, being much harsher on Kurdish women, has presented a blend of feminism and Kurdish nationalism in the struggle for Kurdish self-determination.

The 1979 Revolution in Iran was an outcome of discontent against the Pahlavi monarchical rule, with the immediate cause being economic depression. The Pahlavis were inspired by the Turkish revolutionary Kemal Atatürk, who introduced liberal reforms in Turkey, shifting it from a theocratic monarchy to a secular liberal nation. But in a desperation to introduce these liberal reforms, the Pahlavis ultimately cracked down upon women who preferred to wear the hijab. To integrate women into public life, Reza Shah Pahlavi passed the Unveiling Act of 1936. But in the pretext of ‘integration’, the women were forced to unveil in public. This resulted in many women staying back in their homes to avoid humiliating confrontations with the police. Under pro-Western Reza Shah Pahlavi, the hijab became something that was legislated. In 1935, the monarchy prohibited the veil for women and made Western clothing compulsory for men, resulting in the Goharshad Mosque Rebellion. At the time, many women covered their heads either as a form of protest against the monarchy or to adhere to societal norms tied to concepts of honour. But following the revolution, with Ayatollah Khamenei at the helm, wearing of the hijab became even more prevalent.

The 1979 revolution, on the other extreme, made it compulsory for women to wear the hijab. In the absence of an enforcement authority of these morality codes, the basijs were ordered to supervise schools and universities to ensure the proper enforcement of the hijab laws. The Women’s Day of 1979 was ushered in with the slogan- “In the dawn of freedom, there is an absence of freedom”. Many women who preferred to wear the hijab came out in solidarity with a larger cause and in opposition to compulsory hijab, agitating for hijab to be a choice and not a compulsion. Even though Khomeini initially said that it was just a suggestion to put on the hijab, it later emerged as a compulsion. Thus, the history of Iran and its women lies in a complex web of ‘unhijabing’ and ‘hijabing’ legislations.

The phrase “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” gained prominence after the murder of Mahsa Amini- a 22-year-old Kurdish woman (discussed later), but it was first chanted on 8th March 2006 at the International Women’s Day demonstrations by Kurdish women across Turkey. Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) since 1999, is generally credited with the phrase. He viewed women as the primary revolutionary vanguard and was inspired by the eco-anarchist Murray Bookchin’s radical municipalism, which led him to denounce statism, linking it to patriarchal, violent, and anti-democratic institutions. He favoured a model of participatory grassroots self-administration, which he termed ‘democratic confederalism,’ central to which lies “jineology”- a Kurdish version of feminism meaning “science of women”. An autonomous women's organisation was announced as early as the 3rd Congress of the PKK. In 1987, the Kurdistan Patriotic Women's Union (YJWK) was founded. Through this organisation, the Kurdish women asserted that they were not only fighting for self-determination in an armed struggle in the mountains but were also resisting the patriarchal attitudes of their male comrades in the guerrilla movement.

Iranian Kurdistan-Rojhelat spans rugged mountainous terrains southeast of Mount Ararat and the Zagros Mountains in northwest Iran. Being the 3rd largest ethnic-minority in the country, they form nearly 15% of the total population, i.e., 7 million. These are mere estimates as the Islamist government doesn’t allow the census of the ethnic-minorities. Iranian state repression against Kurds starts with banning the Kurdish name, causing the parallel existence of ‘official-legal’ and ‘unofficial-illegal’ Kurdish names at their homes at the same time. Even a small suspicion can lead the Kurds to prison. Kurds make up nearly 50% of political prisoners in Iran, despite constituting only 15% of the population.

The streets of Iran have been witnessing anti-government protests by young men and women alike since the murder of the 22-year-old Kurdish woman named Mahsa Amini by Iran’s moral police, called the Gasht-e-Ershad, on the accusations of “improper hijab”. The murder of Mahsa Amini was not just a trigger point of feminist aspirations in Iran, but also for the aspirations of Kurdistan, which for long has been oppressed by the Islamist regime in Iran. Along with the factor of women’s rights, the voices of the ethnic minority Kurds also received a new energy after the incident. On the news being made viral in social media, feminist groups took the streets, comprising of nearly two thousand protestors found inspiration in the Kurdish revolutionary slogan, “Woman, Life, Freedom” or Jin, Jiyan, Azadi- reminding their 2017 Rojava campaign in Syria when the Kurdish forces, mandated by women, drove out the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Apart from Mahsa Amini, on 4th February 2025, a woman stripped completely naked, leapt over the car of the morality police, a method to show discontent against strict dress codes on women by the Iranian theocratic government. There have been at least 24 women executed in Iran in 2024. At least 95 Kurdish women have been executed for political activities since the 1979 revolution. For Kurdish women, violence is political and gendered, not just to silence their struggles but to perpetuate authoritarian and patriarchal dominance in society. Punishing them is an indicator of the state’s war against Kurdish women's movements to perpetuate and reproduce male-dominated power relations by using extreme force and targeting women who are struggling for justice and self-determination. Protests are still ongoing in Iran.

SISTERHOOD IN AN ARMED STRUGGLE

The Kurdish voice for national self-determination isn’t just limited to the streets, but has a long history of armed struggle. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), affiliated to the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), was established in 2004, operating with the principles of democratic confederalism and jinelogy as espoused by Abdullah Ocalan- actively working in the Kurdish region of all the four nations. Designated as a terrorist group by the US, Iran, and Turkey, PJAK comprises nearly 2500-3000 fighters, of whom half are women. However, PJAK’s projection as a terrorist group is nothing but a broader hostility of the US and its allies towards Marxist-Leninist groups. PJAK places great importance on gender equality, both ideologically and organizationally. The establishment of the Women's Defence Forces (HPJ) is a point in favour of PJAK, as it demonstrates its support for women's empowerment. This force not only participates in military activities but also acts as a platform to advance women's rights and oppose the patriarchal tradition of Kurdish society.

The PJAK has conducted a series of significant battles with Iranian officials, most notably through cross-border raids originating in Iraqi Kurdistan. In April 2006, PJAK conducted raids into northwestern Iran that claimed the lives of 24 Iranian security officials. The raids were claimed to be in response to Iranian troops' shooting dead 10 Kurdish protesters in the town of Maku. PJAK's armed campaign against the Iranian regime has witnessed various escalations. In May 2006, PJAK attacked a government building in Kermanshah, wounding five people. By April 2009, it launched simultaneous attacks on police stations in Kermanshah and Kordistan provinces, killing as many as 24 Iranian policemen and sustaining approximately 10 militants' losses. This prompted retaliatory helicopter attacks against Kurdish villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, displacing more than 800 civilians. Fighting escalated in mid-2011 when Iran's IRGC mounted a large-scale offensive that killed more than 180 PJAK militants and displaced 230 families. There was a ceasefire until September 2011. Fighting broke out again in July 2018, when PJAK attacked a Marivan border outpost and killed 10 IRGC soldiers, a steadfast refusal to submit to Iranian state authority.

A BROADER STRUGGLE FOR POST-COLONIAL FEMINISM

Lastly, Kurdish feminism forms a broader part of post-colonial feminism, where jineology rejects the Western liberal version of feminism, which has generally detached itself from grassroots struggles. Unlike Western nationalism, which has been exclusionary since the last part of the 19th century, Kurdish nationalism navigates the tensions between women’s liberation and nationalist struggle. It suffers not only under patriarchy but also under the double-yoke of ethno-nationalist state violence and repression. It has refused to subsume feminist demands under male-dominated nationalism, yet remains deeply committed to Kurdish self-determination, indicating the “double colonisation” thesis that women are oppressed both by the colonial and the post-colonial state forces within the patriarchal structures fostered and nurtured by both parties.

Armed feminist struggle for an independent Kurdistan, like PJAK, instils the legitimacy of Frantz Fanon’s arguments that armed struggle and violence are necessary to overthrow imperial systems. Through this, the oppressed group reclaims their humanity and dignity. Fanon was equally critical of post-independence nationalist elites who only cared about the transfer of power and would mimic the existing bourgeoisie system. He warned that unless nationalism is accompanied by genuine social transformation, it will construct a new form of exploitation. Kurdish feminist-nationalist movements echo this critique by rejecting patriarchal nationalism and laying their allegiance to democratic confederalism and radical democracy.

CONCLUSION

The Kurdish women's struggle in Iran represents a singular intersection of feminist and nationalist opposition to an oppressive theocratic state. While Iranian Islamic feminists protest mandatory hijab legislation from within the discourse of faith, Kurdish feminists embrace a more secular, left-leaning vision that openly challenges both state patriarchy and religious impositions. Their call, Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom), has crossed borders and movements to become a metonym for a wider struggle for freedom, dignity, and justice. From their resistance to compelled veiling in the Islamist regime to their defiance of entrenched gender norms within their societies, Kurdish women have made a unique contribution to the global feminist struggle. Their political exclusion and systemic brutality- disproportionate incarceration, state persecution, and execution— highlight the gendered character of Iran's repression. And their ongoing defiance, either in the form of grassroots demonstrations or armed struggle under PJAK and HPJ, announces a dogged and dynamic challenge to authoritarianism.

Ultimately, Kurdish feminist nationalism in Iran is not simply the ability to wear or not wear the hijab- it is an overarching call for self-determination, gender equality, and freedom from all domination. While protests persist and global attention continues, their resistance provides not just a critique of Iranian policy but a radical redefinition of what feminism and freedom can be in the 21st century.

Bibliography

Stansfield, G. 2014. “Kurds, Persian Nationalism, and Shi’i Rule: Surviving Dominant Nationhood in Iran.” In Conflict, Democratisation, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, edited by D. Romano and M. Gurses, 59–84. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Shaheryar, S. (2020, May 9). Is decolonisation always a violent phenomenon? E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/09/is-decolonisation-always-a-violent-phenomenon/